Bond requirement
Another key area of focus for the proposal is the P-Rep bond requirement which solves the "skin in the game" issue on our network. Presently, there is a mismatch of risk in our design. Outside of time and node costs, P-Reps have no ICX collateral at risk compared to voters who face a potential 6% slash.
While we would concede that slashing is an unlikely outcome given the maturity and stability of the network, we still think this needs to change.
- Therefore, in the 3.0 proposal, we will remove any potential burning of ICX voters. Yes, this is meant to protect VOTERS! And subsequently, mandate P-Reps post the bond as 6% of their delegation amount. So for example, if a P-Rep had 1 million votes, the P-Rep would need to hold 60,000 ICX in a bond.
Governance slashing
Additionally, we want to introduce more stringent governance slashing to deter exchanges and passive nodes from joining.
Here are some key updates:
- Network Proposals would be increased from 1 day to 3 days to give teams enough time to submit a vote
- Votes will no longer close upon reaching majority to allow all teams to vote
- Missed Network Proposal vote: slash 20% of the required bond
- Submitting i_rep outside of range: slash 20% of the required bond
- Range = 50% (+/-) from current i_rep
- Forces P-Reps to pay attention to i_rep regularly
- Only applies to Main P-Reps
- Missing a Contribution Proposal Vote (not currently live): slash 20% of the required bond
Ability to Prevent Additional Delegation
Lastly, we want to be able to prevent nodes from receiving votes. The ICON Foundation node is a clear example of this need. Despite consistent efforts, and the ICON Foundation team requesting the community to delegate to other teams, unfortunately, we still receive votes.
This can be used by other nodes as well such as:
- Those that may want to permanently stay out of governance in fear of getting slashed
- Others that may not want to continue increasing their ICX bond
- Exchanges and passive self-delegated nodes